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 COMMENT 
Getting to Guilty: The Necessary Shift 
to Individual Accountability for 
Corporate Wrongdoing 
By Paige Wheeler* 
ABSTRACT 
In September of 2015, Deputy Attorney General, Sally Yates, declared that 
the Department of Justice would shift its focus to pursuing individual ac-
countability for cases of corporate wrongdoing. This shift reflects a change 
in directives, as the Department of Justice commonly resolved cases of 
corporate wrongdoing through the companies themselves prior to what is 
now commonly known as the Yates Memorandum. The Yates Memoran-
dum centers on the conclusion that one of the most successful ways to 
tackle corporate misconduct is by making sure that the individuals who are 
committing the wrongdoing are held accountable for their actions. The 
Yates Memorandum hopes to achieve this goal of individual accountabil-
ity by implementing incentives for large corporations to cooperate with the 
Department of Justice. Prosecuting corporate crime, however, presents 
unique issues that will likely still make holding individuals accountable 
for their corporate wrongdoing a challenge, regardless of the new direc-
tives set forth in the Yates Memorandum. Although the Yates Memoran-
dum will not resolve all of the challenges involved in prosecuting corpo-
rate crimes, it is a necessary shift in the right direction that is an effective 
use of the Department of Justice’s resources in an effort to identify the 
culpable individuals who commit corporate crimes and hold them account-
able for their wrongdoing. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has fixated on resolving cases 
of corporate wrongdoing against the companies themselves first, and then on indi-
viduals second.1 In September of 2015, however, Deputy Attorney General Sally 
Yates announced new directives for the DOJ regarding companies seeking corpo-
ration credit, through what is commonly known as the Yates Memorandum.2 
The sole focus of the Yates Memorandum was to announce to the DOJ the new 
directives that should be followed in regards to accountability for corporate wrong-
doing, which involved a great shift from how these cases were handled in the past.3 
This new shift, directing attention to holding individuals accountable for corporate 
wrongdoing, came at a time when the DOJ was in a need of a change in approach 
to this problem, which in the eyes of many, was getting out of hand.4 Now, with the 
financial crisis of 2008 in the rearview,5 the DOJ has acknowledged its previous 
shortcomings and that there are better methods to bring individuals who engage in 
corporate wrongdoing to justice. 
The corporate crime issue likely got out of hand because it is such a unique and 
complex creature, often leaving the DOJ with its hands tied in certain situations. 
Obtaining the necessary resources to prosecute corporate crimes of a complex na-
ture presents a challenge in itself, not to mention chancing all of the time and money 
spent to litigate a case on the gamble that a jury will be able to return a conviction. 
People v. Davis illustrates the difficulties and risks of litigating corporate 
crimes of a complicated nature.6 The course of events in Davis exemplifies the ex-
treme difficulty of presenting these infinitely complex cases to a panel of jurors in 
a way they can understand, let alone comprehend enough to find there is no reason-
able doubt as to the criminal actions of these individuals.7 
Even faced with these prosecutorial challenges, the DOJ recognized that there 
was room for improvement in the handling of corporate crime through the directives 
brought forward in the Yates Memorandum. This shift involved a new focus of 
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     1.  William E. Lawler, III & Jeremy Keeney, DOJ’s Yates Memorandum: Focus Enforcement Efforts 
on Individuals, 83 DEF. COUNS. J. 200, 203 (2016). 
 2. Id. at 201. 
 3. Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Assis-
tant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div. 2 (Sept. 9, 2015) (on file with the University of Missouri Business, 
Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review) [hereinafter Yates Memorandum] (noting that this memorandum 
was also addressed to several assistant attorneys general and all U.S. attorneys). 
 4. William E. Lawler, III & Jeremy Keeney, White Collar Defense and Investigation and Corporate 
Counsel, IADC COMMITTEE NEWSL. 3 (Dec. 2015), https://www.velaw.com/Insights/DOJ-s-Yates-
Memorandum--Focus-Enforcement-Efforts-on-Individuals/. 
 5. Kimberly Amadeo, The 2008 Financial Crisis, THE BALANCE (July 1, 2017), https://www.the-
balance.com/2008-financial-crisis-3305679. 
 6. People v. Davis et al., No. 773 (N.Y. 2014) (noting that this case was not the result of a federal 
indictment, but rather one by the state of New York). 
 7. Sara Randazzo & Nichole Hong, Jury in Dewey Law-Firm Case Felt Inundated by Details, WALL 
STREET J. (Oct. 20, 2015, 3:58 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/jury-in-dewey-law-firm-case-inun-
dated-by-details-1445333584. 
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holding culpable individuals accountable for their actions, rather than the corpora-
tion as a whole.8 
Seven months after the Yates Memorandum was issued, in April of 2016, the 
DOJ released the Fraud Section’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement Plan, 
which is commonly known as the Pilot Program.9 The Pilot Program declared that 
full cooperation by companies requires, “as set forth in the [Yates Memorandum] 
disclosure on a timely basis of all facts relevant to the wrongdoing at issue, includ-
ing all facts related to involvement in the criminal activity by the corporation’s of-
ficer, employee’s or agents.”10 Therefore, the Yates Memorandum, along with the 
Pilot Program, greatly contributes to the newly shaped meaning of “cooperation” 
through the DOJ’s concentration on individuals.11 
Although the directive to hold individuals accountable for their corporate 
wrongdoing is seen as a favorable move by some, there is also growing concern that 
the Yates Memorandum may actually hinder the very objectives it hopes to 
achieve.12 Both the legislative and judicial branches of government have expressed 
concern that federal prosecutors are attempting to criminalize conduct that is not 
criminal by construing the law too broadly, which would ultimately result in over-
criminalization.13 
United States v. Pacific Gas and Electric Company is an example of why fed-
eral courts, including the Supreme Court, have concerns of over-criminalization re-
sulting from federal prosecutors broadening their interpretations of the law.14 Pa-
cific Gas and Electric Company involved the DOJ indicting and convicting Pacific 
Gas and Company (“PG&E”) on a theory of corporate collective knowledge,15 
something that the DOJ has not done in over 30 years.16 After receiving highly con-
troversial grand jury instructions, the grand jury returned an indictment charging 
PG&E for “willfully” disregarding federal regulations, despite no evidence showing 
that any single employee acted willfully.17 Additionally, PG&E, as a corporation, 
was convicted because several employees had knowledge of incriminating prac-
tices.18 Those individuals did not face charges themselves.19 Therefore, this decision 
directly contradicts the new directives laid out in the Yates Memorandum and 
causes speculation that the DOJ has not necessarily changed its ways. 
This article will explain and analyze the directives taken by the DOJ to combat 
corporate wrongdoing. Part II will consider the unique challenges that prosecuting 
                                                          
 8. Yates Memorandum, supra note 3, at 2. 
 9. Ann Sultan, What Recent DOJ Corporate Enforcement Actions Mean for Cooperating Companies, 
BLOOMBERG BNA 1 (Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.millerchevalier.com/sites/default/files/re-
sources/BloombergBNA-DOJ-Corporate-Enforcement-Actions.pdf. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Michael P. Kelly & Ruth E. Mandelbaum, Are the Yates Memorandum and the Federal Judici-
ary’s Concerns About Over-Criminalization Destined to Collide?, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 899, 900 
(2016). 
 13. Id. at 899. 
 14. United States v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., No.14-cr-00175-TEH, 2016 BL 240175, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 
July 26, 2016); Kelly & Mandelbaum, supra note 12, at 899. 
 15. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 2016 BL 240175, at *2-5. 
 16. Stephen P. Solow & Mark L. Farley, What Does a Corporation Have to Know to Be Guilty of a 
Crime?: The Conviction of PG&E Bases on Corporate Collective Knowledge, DAILY ENV’T REP. 1 
(Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.kattenlaw.com/files/162466_PGE_Solow_Farley.pdf. 
 17. Id. at 2. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
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corporate crime presents for the DOJ and the criticisms they have faced. Part III 
will discuss the new shift of focus to individual accountability taken to address this, 
and part IV will examine whether this was the right decision, amid growing con-
cerns of expansive interpretation of the law and over-criminalization. 
II.  PROSECUTORIAL CHALLENGES UNIQUE TO CORPORATE CRIME 
Especially since the Financial Crisis of 2008, the DOJ has faced extensive crit-
icism for not bringing individuals to justice for committing corporate financial 
crimes.20 A recent pattern in the prosecution, or attempted prosecution, of corporate 
wrongdoing suggests that law enforcement officials are failing to choose the right 
cases, and prosecute them in the courtroom in a comprehendible way to jurors.21 
This issue arises because it is unlikely that the average working American can un-
derstand the modern financial system, given its immense, overwhelming complex-
ities.22 
Taking on a case that is destined for failure does not make good sense, espe-
cially when prosecuting individuals for complex corporate crimes.23 Preparing for 
any trial requires vast resources, two of the most important being time and money.24 
Given the depletion of resources resulting from preparing cases of a complex nature 
for litigation, it is not a risk prosecutors are often willing to take, nor should they 
be expected to.25 
A. People v. Davis 
A case prosecuted by the Manhattan District Attorney, People v. Davis,26 in-
volved the kind of fraud that is often pursued by the federal government. Its out-
come effectively highlights the complications prosecutors face in seeking to hold 
individuals accountable for committing crimes of this complex nature.27 
In March of 2014, after a two-year investigation, the state of New York indicted 
three individuals who had previously been top executives at Dewey & LeBoeuf 
LLP.28 Chairman Steven Davis, former Executive Director, Stephen DiCarmine, 
and former Chief Financial Officer, Joel Sanders, were indicted on charges that 
“they misled lenders, other lawyers and investors about the firm’s financial health 
                                                          
 20. Matt Apuzzo & Ben Protess, Justice Department Sets Sights on Wall Street Executives, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/10/us/politics/new-justice-dept-rules-aimed-
at-prosecuting-corporate-executives.html. 
 21. Sheelah Kolhatkar, Has It Become Impossible to Prosecute White-Collar Crime?, BLOOMBERG 
(Oct. 21, 2015, 1:04 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-21/has-it-become-impos-
sible-to-prosecute-white-collar-crime-. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Russell Mokhiber, 20 Things You Should Know About Corporate Crime, HARV. L. REC. (Mar. 24, 
2015), http://hlrecord.org/2015/03/20-things-you-should-know-about-corporate-crime/. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. People v. Davis et al., No. 773 (N.Y. 2014). 
 27. Chris Dolmetsch & Tiffany Kary, Dewey & LeBoeuf Case Ends With Hung Jury and Mistrial, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 19, 2015, 4:20 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-19/dewey-
judge-declares-mistrial-after-jury-deadlocks-on-chrages. 




The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 1 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol1/iss2/8
No. 2] Wheeler; Getting to Guilty 509 
before it spiraled into bankruptcy.”29 The investigation, which led to these charges, 
began after a group of Dewey partners pushed Manhattan District Attorney, Cyrus 
Vance’s office to investigate possible wrongdoing at the firm.30 One month after 
the investigation began in 2012, Dewey filed its Chapter 11 petition declaring bank-
ruptcy, placing them in the record books as the largest U.S. law firm to ever go 
bankrupt.31 
According to the indictment in the New York State Supreme Court, defendants 
“Davis, DiCarmine and Sanders were [each] charged . . . with grand larceny, fraud, 
falsifying business records and conspiracy.”32 These allegations “contributed to the 
collapse of [the] prestigious international law firm, which forced thousands of peo-
ple out of jobs and left creditors holding the bag on hundreds of millions of dollars 
owed to them.”33 The prosecutors also contended that the defendants falsely re-
ported that Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP was in compliance with a “cash flow covenant,” 
which required the firm to maintain a minimum year-end cash flow.34 Further, the 
indictment stated that from late 2008 to 2012, Davis, DiCarmine, and Sanders al-
legedly caused other employees at the firm to make tens of millions of dollars of 
fraudulent accounting entries that made Dewey look healthier than it was.35 
After a four-month trial, which included testimony from 41 witnesses, the case 
alleging that the three former executives were guilty of more than 150 counts in a 
financial fraud scheme that collapsed Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP, resulted only in 
proving that the complexity of the case was too much for jurors to handle.36 
The mistrial . . . in the closely-watched case is the latest example of the 
hurdles prosecutors face bringing complex financial cases to a jury. Pros-
ecutors and enforcement officials have been criticized for failing to charge 
individuals with wrongdoing in the wake of the financial crisis, often opt-
ing for large monetary settlements instead. But such cases can be highly 
complex and carry long odds of getting past juries with scant financial 
backgrounds.37 
In sum, the Davis case effectively demonstrates why these types of cases often 
never reach the courtroom, but rather result in plea agreements. Thus, there is in 
fact a great risk involved in bringing an ambitious case to trial, contrary to popular 
belief. This risk involves suffering the loss of an immense amount of time and 
money on behalf of the government if anything other than a guilty verdict is re-
turned, as shown here in the Davis case. 
The prosecution’s case relied heavily on internal emails and the testimony of 
several cooperating witnesses, which included the firm’s former Finance Director, 
Frank Canellas, who informed the jury that he provided defendants Davis and Sand-
ers with a list of accounting tricks in order to help conceal the firm’s financial 
                                                          
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Randazzo & Hong, supra note 7. 
 37. Id. 
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troubles.38 Although the defense called no witnesses, the prosecution called more 
than 40, and defense council chose to use the cross-examination of these witnesses 
to prove to the jury that their clients did not know about the fraud.39 The defense 
argument clearly left enough room for reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors. 
The defense poked holes in Canella’s credibility by depicting him as a bully in the 
workplace, and argued that even if the accounting practices were illegal, the prose-
cution did not show that the three defendant executives had criminal intent.40 The 
defense also provoked doubt by contending that the firm’s accounting was not the 
reason for their ultimate collapse, but rather it resulted from certain key partners 
leaving the firm.41 
The Davis case proved to be too much for the jurors to handle from the start. 
“Opening statements turned into an hours-long explanation of concepts like dis-
bursement write-offs and reclassifying lease termination payments.”42 Prosecutors 
struggled to lay out a clear narrative from the beginning, and the jurors’ confusion 
continued from this point on.43 This proved to neither be enough to acquit, nor con-
vict the three former executives.44 Yet, at the onset of deliberations, the jury deter-
mined various acquittals for various counts that were deemed not as serious as oth-
ers.45 On the larger counts, however, such as grand larceny, scheme to defraud, vi-
olating the Martin Act, and the New York Securities law, the jurors were dead-
locked.46 
The strenuous deliberations came to an end when the jury sent a note to the 
court for the third time expressing that it was deadlocked on the major counts.47 
After the jury indicated that it was “hopelessly” deadlocked, Justice Robert Stolz 
asked the jurors if further instruction on the law would help.48 After the jury said 
that further instruction on the law would not be beneficial, Justice Stolz declared a 
mistrial.49 
At the conclusion of all the testimony, and after 22 days and over 120 hours of 
deliberations, some of the jurors voiced their frustration at the lack of a verdict.50 
The general consensus was that the piles of evidence and testimony were just too 
difficult to absorb.51 One juror said that she felt like “people were going a little 
crazy toward the end because they really didn’t understand the law” and that “[they] 
couldn’t go any further.”52 Another juror said that many jurors made up their minds 
early on and favored acquittal on the bulk of the counts, but they refused to budge 
                                                          
 38. Brendan Pierson, Judge Declares Mistrial in Criminal Trial of Ex-Dewey & LeBoeuf Executives, 
REUTERS (Oct. 19, 2015, 3:01 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/usa-crime-dewey-
idUSL1N12J1T320151019. 
 39. Dolmetsch & Kary, supra note 27. 
 40. Pierson, supra note 38. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Randazzo, & Hong, supra note 7. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Pierson, supra note 38. 
 45. Randazzo & Hong, supra note 7. 
 46. Pierson, supra note 38. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Randazzo & Hong, supra note 7. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
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during deliberations.53 A third juror said that there was “absolute confusion” among 
the jurors and heated arguments erupted because “some were looking for that smok-
ing gun.”54 
The Davis outcome suggests that the prosecutors miscalculated by overwhelm-
ing the panel of jurors with too much detail.55 This is evident due to the jurors ex-
pressing that they needed “more explanation of what [exactly] made the accounting 
adjustments illegal[,] and . . . which exhibits corresponded with which charges.”56 
This issue may very well be where the nucleus of the problem lies: in the fact that 
the average juror cannot understand the vast complexities cases of this nature pre-
sent, and are further challenged to decipher how the complicated situation at hand 
is applied to the law. 
B. Has Corporate Crime Grown So Complex That it is Beyond the 
Law? 
The challenges presented to prosecuting attorneys in People v. Davis57 shed 
light on a deeper problem and emerging concern: the idea that due to growing com-
plexities, corporate crime is becoming increasingly difficult to prosecute, which 
makes it a crime on the verge of being “beyond the reach of the law.”58 
White-collar crime is not nearly as dramatic and straightforward as violent 
crime; however, its financial impact is immense, and can affect a large sum of peo-
ple.59 As an illustration, if someone with a gun walked into a bank and made off 
with less than $5,000, he would likely be charged, convicted at trial without com-
plication, and depending on the defendant’s history, spend at least an estimated five 
years in prison.60 Most jurors can easily connect the dots in this type of crime.61 In 
comparison, the estimated range of $300 billion to $600 billion that fraud, con jobs, 
and embezzlement reportedly cost taxpayers, coupled with the fact that few, if any, 
of the financial executives that commit these crimes serve any time in prison, can 
provide for frustration among American taxpayers.62 The problems underlying 
complex financial crimes are more complicated than most Americans know. 
Violent crimes and white-collar crimes differ in many ways, but above all, the 
most important factor that separates the two is the level of understanding required 
to investigate the crimes, bring charges, and get a conviction from a panel of jurors. 
For example, fraud and money laundering allegations require knowledge of much 
different concepts than violent crimes.63 These unique challenges for the govern-
ment often present themselves long before opening statements begin at trial.64 First, 
                                                          
 53. Pierson, supra note 38. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Randazzo & Hong, supra note 7. 
 56. Id. 
 57. People v. Davis et al., No. 773 (N.Y. 2014). 
 58. Kolhatkar, supra note 21. 
 59. Bruce Kennedy, Why White Collar Criminals Often Get Away, CBS NEWS: MONEYWATCH (May 
11, 2015, 3:38 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/getting-away-with-white-collar-crime/. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Could the Complexity of White Collar Crime Help Defendants?, FRANK BURINO, 
http://www.frankrubino.com/Legal-Articles/Could-the-Complexity-of-White-Collar-Crimes-Help-De-
fendants.shtml (last visited Dec. 19, 2017). 
 64. Id. 
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law enforcement officials must focus on their most pressing needs, and allocate their 
resources accordingly.65 While any complex case can drain resources, white-collar 
crimes expend more time and money than most other types of cases.66 In fact, this 
draining of resources, time and money, needed to investigate such activities is one 
of the major obstacles in combating white-collar crime, especially when it comes 
down to following the money trail.67 
Susan Deehan, Chair and CEO of Actionable Intelligence Technology, a de-
veloper and supplier of financial investigation systems, expressed that white-collar 
crime is far down on the list in terms of closed cases.68 Deehan described “[t]he 
reason for this is not inattention or indifference on the part of law enforcement, but 
on the complexity of white collar crime and the difficulty of making and proving a 
case.”69 In fact, even prosecutors can struggle to understand the complicated finan-
cial scenarios encompassed in some white-collar crimes.70 They are often advised 
to simplify the issues, something that is easier said than done.71 
If a case is headed to a jury . . . the prosecuting attorneys may have the 
difficult task [of] turning thousands of pages of financial records, account-
ing procedures and other complex evidence into information that a jury of 
laypeople can easily understand. They face added challenges because ju-
rors are generally unfamiliar with white collar crimes, and the defendants 
are often upstanding members of a community.72 
The challenges present both in investigating and prosecuting white-collar 
crimes, can often result in leaving defendants with opportunities for strong defense 
cases.73 If the prosecutor finds difficulty in understanding and sorting through the 
intricate link of facts that gave rise to charges, this leaves holes for a defense attor-
ney to identify weaknesses in the evidence, and can use these to create doubt and 
make the defendant’s case stronger.74 Needless to say, there are many risks involved 
in litigating complex corporate crime cases. To say that prosecutors worry about 
whether jurors will understand and buy into a case involving white collar crime is 
an understatement.75 This worry could therefore encourage prosecutors to enter into 
plea agreements with individuals charged with these types of corporate crimes in 
order to avoid the risks involved with taking cases of this nature to trial.76 
Likely as a product of these challenges and the risks involved with taking a 
multifaceted corporate crime case to trial, the DOJ frequently enters into plea agree-
ments, deferred prosecution agreements, or non-prosecution agreements in order to 
resolve criminal investigations.77 As a result of these types of agreements, many 
                                                          
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Kennedy, supra note 59. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Could the Complexity of White Collar Crime Help Defendants?, supra note 63. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Kelly & Mandelbaum, supra note 12, at 900. 
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top-level executives are able to insulate themselves from personal accountability, 
leaving the corporation itself taking the complete fall and punishment for the crim-
inal conduct of individuals.78 
III.  A CHANGE IN DIRECTIVE 
Not holding individuals accountable for their white-collar criminal actions has 
sparked outrage, especially following the financial crisis of 2008.79 This has forced 
the DOJ to acknowledge the issue, and ultimately caused them to take action in 
response by issuing new directives to be followed in how corporate wrongdoing is 
handled.80 
A. The Yates Memorandum 
The DOJ’s initial action to getting a grasp on battling the corporate crime prob-
lem was through the issuing of a memorandum by Deputy Attorney General, Sally 
Yates, which came to be commonly known as the “Yates Memorandum.”81 The 
Yates Memorandum in its entirety focused on the conclusion that one of the most 
effective ways to battle misconduct by corporations is by holding accountable those 
individuals who are perpetrating the wrongdoing.82 
The Yates Memorandum started off by expressing that “[f]ighting corporate 
fraud and other misconduct is a top priority of the Department of Justice.”83 The 
measures described in the Yates Memorandum are instructed to be steps that are to 
be taken “in any investigation of corporate misconduct.”84 Notably, Yates said that 
“[the] [M]emo is designed to ensure that all attorneys across the Department are 
consistent in [their] best efforts to hold to account the individuals responsible for 
illegal corporate conduct.”85 Yates expressed that individual accountability is im-
portant for a number of reasons: “it deters future illegal activity, it incentivizes 
changes in corporate behavior, it ensures that the proper parties are held responsible 
for their actions, and it promotes the public’s confidence in [the] justice system.”86 
The Yates Memorandum specifically instructs the DOJ to look more broadly from 
the beginning of its investigation.87 In doing so, the DOJ would focus its collective 
attention on both the corporation and the individuals suspected of corporate wrong-
doing starting at the onset of an investigation.88 
The Memo has six key steps to be followed in order for the DOJ to support its 
pursuit of individual corporate wrongdoing.89 The six steps outlined in the Memo-
randum include the following: 
                                                          
 78. Kolhatkar, supra note 21. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Yates Memorandum, supra note 3, at 2. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 1. 
 84. Id. at 2. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 1. 
 87. Lawler & Keeney, supra note 4, at 203-04. 
 88. Yates Memorandum, supra note 3, at 2. 
 89. Id. 
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(1) in order to qualify for any cooperation credit, corporations must pro-
vide to the Department all relevant facts relating to the individuals respon-
sible for the misconduct; 
(2) criminal and civil corporate investigations should focus on individuals 
from the inception of the investigation; 
(3) criminal and civil attorneys handling corporate investigations should 
be in routine communication with one another; 
(4) absent extraordinary circumstances or approved department policy, 
the Department will not release culpable individuals from civil or criminal 
liability when resolving a matter with a corporation; 
(5) Department attorneys should not resolve matters with a corporation 
without a clear plan to resolve related individual cases, and should memo-
rialize any declinations as to individuals in such cases; and 
(6)  civil attorneys should consistently focus on individuals as well as the 
company and evaluate whether to bring suit against an individual based on 
considerations beyond that individual’s ability to pay.90 
Deputy Attorney General Yates has also directed certain provisions in the 
United States Attorney’s Manual to reflect the changes and that the guidance pro-
vided throughout the Memo will be applicable to all of the Department’s future 
investigations of corporate wrongdoing.91 Generally speaking, these directives im-
pose various requirements on cooperating companies.92 Most notable, is the require-
ment directing such companies being investigated for corporate wrongdoing to af-
firmatively hand over possible culpable employees.93 For many, this was seen as 
the DOJ’s response to Congress and others who have critiqued the DOJ for not 
sufficiently going after the individuals responsible for corporate wrongdoing.94 
Now, in light of the Yates Memorandum, the DOJ is explicitly directed to focus its 
enforcement efforts on these individuals, who previously may have otherwise es-
caped liability.95 
The Yates Memorandum outlines incentives for corporations to be forthright 
with suspected individuals involved in misconduct from the start of the investiga-
tion.96 For example, “in order for a company to receive any consideration for coop-
eration under the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, the 
company must completely disclose to the Department all relevant facts about indi-
vidual misconduct.”97 Therefore, in order “to be eligible for any credit for coopera-
tion, the company [being investigated] must identify all individuals involved in or 
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responsible for the misconduct [in question], regardless of their position, status or 
seniority, and [further] provide to the Department all facts relating to [the alleged] 
misconduct.”98 
B. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement Plan and Guidance 
After the Yates Memorandum was published, in April of 2016, the DOJ re-
leased the Fraud Section’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement Plan 
(“FCPA”).99 The FCPA regulates international corruption through the use of two 
approaches.100 These two approaches consist of the accounting provisions, and the 
anti-bribery provisions.101 The accounting provisions require subject corporations 
to provide regular reports to the SEC, “mandate maintenance of accurate records, 
and require the establishment of internal compliance controls.”102 These subject cor-
porations include both foreign and domestic companies traded on U.S. stock ex-
changes.103 In addition, “the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions criminalize the transfer 
of money or other gifts to foreign officials and political actors with the intent to 
influence[,] obtain[,] or retain business.”104 These anti-bribery prohibitions pertain 
to conduct by securities issuers, U.S. citizens and entities, and certain foreign na-
tionals and entities.105 
The DOJ recognizes that FCPA investigations involve unique challenges that 
create a undeniable need for “centralized supervision, guidance, and resolution, in-
cluding complex issues involving transnational detection, collection of evidence, 
and enforcement.”106 Due to this, the Fraud Section frequently partners with the 
United States Attorney’s Office on these matters.107 As a whole, the DOJ is com-
mitted to enhancing its efforts to uncover and prosecute both individuals and com-
panies for violations of the FCPA.108 
The FCPA’s plan has in fact its own memorandum written by Andrew Weiss-
mann, Chief of the Fraud Section within the Criminal Division of the DOJ.109 This 
memorandum sets forth three steps in an enhanced FCPA enforcement strategy.110 
The first step involves the DOJ strengthening its investigative and prosecutorial ef-
forts by significantly increasing its FCPA law enforcement resources.111 This step 
is very important because the new resources will substantially enhance “the ability 
of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section and the [FBI] to detect and prosecute in-
dividuals and companies that violate the FCPA.”112 The second step is the DOJ 
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taking action to “strengthe[n] its coordination with foreign counterparts in the effort 
to hold corrupt individuals and companies accountable.”113 The third step, and the 
most notable, is the guidance to FCPA attorneys about how the Fraud Section will 
pursue what has come to be known as the Pilot Program.114 
The Pilot Program ties in directly with the Yates Memorandum and applies to 
companies that voluntarily cooperate or disclose matters during the one-year pilot 
period under the FCPA.115 “The principal goal of this [P]rogram is to promote 
greater accountability for individuals and companies that engage in corporate crime 
by motivating companies to voluntarily selfdisclose FCPA-related misconduct, [to] 
fully cooperate with the Fraud Section, and, where appropriate, [to] remediate flaws 
in their controls and compliance programs.”116 If the Pilot Program is successful it 
will “serve to further deter individuals and companies from engaging in FCPA vio-
lations in the first place [and] encourage companies to implement strong anti-cor-
ruption compliance programs to prevent and detect FCPA violations.”117 Consistent 
with the Yates Memorandum, if the Pilot Program is successful, it will also improve 
the Fraud Section’s ability to prosecute individuals for their corporate wrongdoing, 
many of whom likely would have gone undiscovered, by gathering proof that would 
otherwise would not have been discovered.118 
The Pilot Program “sets forth the requirements . . . a company must [fulfill in 
order] to qualify for credit for voluntary self-disclosure, cooperation, and timely 
and appropriate remediation.”119 The Pilot Program declared that full cooperation 
by companies requires, “as set forth in the [Yates Memorandum], disclosure on a 
timely basis of all facts relevant to the wrongdoing at issue, including all facts re-
lated to involvement in the criminal activity by the corporation’s officers, employ-
ees or agents.”120 Thus, the meaning of “cooperation” is beginning to take new 
shape as a result of the DOJ’s emphasis on individuals per both the Yates Memo-
randum and the Pilot Program.121 Since the Pilot Program has been implemented, 
however, the DOJ has not necessarily been consistent in the amount of credit given 
for the necessary cooperation it seeks from companies with respect to individuals.122 
IV.  FEARS OF EXPANSIVE STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
The enforcement landscape will drastically change if the DOJ strictly enforces 
the Yates Memorandum and the federal judiciary maintains concerns about expan-
sive criminal statutes.123 “The DOJ [may] succeed in bringing more criminal pros-
ecutions [for corporate wrongdoing; however, this] success will likely come at a 
significant cost.”124 Some prosecutors will predictably feel increased pressure to 
“adopt more expansive statutory interpretations, exercise less caution when 
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evaluating the facts, or put more pressure on corporations to search for and to pro-
duce evidence of individual wrongdoing” due to the fact that the Yates Memoran-
dum exerts pressure on prosecutors to further increase the number of prosecutions 
in addition to their current efforts.125 “Strict enforcement of the Yates Memorandum 
could also [alter] the way that corporations and individuals decide to cooperate with 
the [DOJ].”126 In turn, this could then influence “the size, type, and number of cor-
porate settlements.”127 Companies will have to consider whether they are willing to 
cooperate, and if they are willing to cooperate at all, how they must readjust their 
investigations to satisfy the DOJ.128 Thus, the law enforcement objectives that the 
Memorandum aims to achieve may actually be hindered by these unintended con-
sequences. 129 
These conflicting trends, a “strong desire for individual accountability”, and 
“worry about prosecutorial overreach” are nothing new.130 For over a decade, in 
order to resolve prominent criminal investigations, the DOJ “has entered into hun-
dreds of plea agreements, deferred prosecution agreements, and non-prosecution 
agreements with companies.”131 Although settlements of this type involve admis-
sions of guilt and billions of dollars in fines, the DOJ has not secured nearly “as 
many comparable indictments and convictions of senior executives.”132 In response 
to these agreements, senior DOJ officials have begun voicing a variety of con-
cerns.133 In relevant part, some officials have “questioned whether the companies 
themselves withheld incriminating [evidence and] information about their senior 
officers through the investigation process . . . succeed[ing] in preventing the prose-
cution of [these] individuals.”134 
While the DOJ has these developing concerns, the federal judiciary has grow-
ing concerns of its own.135 Specifically, the federal judiciary has grown increasingly 
dissatisfied with expansive interpretations of criminal statutes and over-criminali-
zation in the United States Code.136 The Supreme Court has found “that narrower 
interpretations reflect a more realistic view of congressional intent” and in recent 
years, has continually rejected over-expansive interpretations of criminal statutes 
with broad language.137 
A. United States v. Pacific Gas and Electric Company 
Once the Yates Memorandum came to light, it seems as though many were 
under the impression that in cases of corporate wrongdoing, only the individuals 
responsible would take the fall.138 United States v. Pacific Gas and Electric 
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Company,139 however, effectively illustrates why the federal judiciary is concerned 
about over-criminalization as a result of federal prosecutors broadening the inter-
pretation of the law; this case also provides a great example of a situation in which 
individual accountability may still be unattainable.140 
The prosecution of PG&E followed the rupture of a natural gas transmission 
line owned and operated by the company on September 9, 2010, in San Bruno, Cal-
ifornia.141 PG&E was convicted of five counts of violating the federal Pipeline 
Safety Act (“PSA”), and one count of obstructing the National Transportation 
Safety Board investigation into the 2010 pipeline explosion.142 In United States v. 
Pacific Gas and Electric Company,143 the DOJ indicted and convicted PG&E on a 
theory of corporate collective knowledge, a largely unused basis for imposing crim-
inal liability, which is what makes this case so significant.144 The theory of corpo-
rate collective knowledge “seeks to aggregate prices of knowledge held by different 
employees, and impute the totality of that knowledge to the corporation as a basis 
for imposing criminal liability on the company.”145 
The indictment in this case alleged that PG&E knowingly and willfully violated 
PSA violations by the following: 
(1) failing to keep records of pressure testing and repairs on natural gas 
transmission lines, (2) relying on erroneous and incomplete information 
when evaluating the integrity of the natural gas transmissions lines, (3) 
failing to identify and evaluate potential threats to the integrity of the 
lines[,] and (4) failing to prioritize lines as high risk after a changed cir-
cumstance.146 
With respect to these violations, this case is noteworthy due to the jury instruc-
tions filed in accordance with them, pertaining to the theory of corporate collective 
knowledge.147 PG&E challenged this theory in a motion to dismiss the indictment 
for erroneous instructions to the grand jury, arguing “that the prosecutor incorrectly 
instructed the grand jury that they could issue an indictment for a knowing and 
willful violation based on a regulatory duty to act and evidence that employees of 
the company knew that the regulatory duty was not being met.”148 The trial judge 
denied the motion.149 
In the final instruction to the jury on the PSA counts, the court instructed that: 
[t]he corporation is . . . considered to have acquired the collective 
knowledge of its employees. The corporation’s “knowledge” is therefore 
the totality of what its employees know within the scope of their 
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employment. The willfulness of corporate employees acting within the 
scope of their employment is imputed to the corporation. Accordingly, if 
a specific employee acted willfully within the scope of his or her employ-
ment, then the corporation can be said to have acted willfully.150 
The first part of this instruction is based on a 1987 decision pertaining to a cash 
transaction reporting and has not been widely accepted in prior prosecutions.151 As 
a result of these instructions, PG&E was not only indicted under this theory, but 
also convicted under the theory of corporate collective knowledge.152 Overall, these 
jury instructions proved to be highly controversial and “PG&E filed a motion for 
judgment of acquittal, arguing that the government [did not meet its burden and] 
failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that any single [PG&E] employee 
acted willfully.”153 
This decision could have significant impact on the future of corporate criminal 
prosecutions.154 If PG&E’s motion for judgment of acquittal is unsuccessful, PG&E 
will likely appeal the conviction and challenge the government’s theory of corpo-
rate liability before the Ninth Circuit.155 No matter how the court decides the case, 
its decision will be significant in shaping the future of corporate criminal prosecu-
tions.156Regardless, this case has upended traditional principles of corporate vicar-
ious liability by allowing the government to aggregate the innocent conduct of com-
pany employees to “manufacture a corporate criminal.”157 Nonetheless, this case 
appears to directly contradict with the Yates Memorandum and its directives to hold 
individuals accountable for corporate wrongdoing. 158 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The issuing of the Yates Memorandum is a step in the right direction as the 
DOJ shifts its focus to holding individuals accountable for their corporate crimes. 
However, bringing individuals to justice likely will not be as easy as the Yates 
Memorandum makes it out to be. The issuing of the Yates Memorandum will not 
eliminate the overwhelming complexities involved with corporate criminal cases 
and it also does not provide tools for prosecutors to effectively explain these com-
plexities to a panel of jurors. Although these new directives will not eliminate the 
risk prosecutors take in bringing a complex corporate crime to trial, the directives 
and incentives will hopefully provide prosecutors with a better avenue to obtain all 
of the relevant evidence needed to present a case to a jury, assuming that corpora-
tions cooperate with the DOJ. 
Although the Yates Memorandum contains directives that will surely enhance 
the DOJ’s capability in holding individuals accountable for corporate wrongdoing, 
it does not change the fact that pursuing individuals for the misconduct of 
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corporations presents its own unique challenges. Responsibility can be diffused in 
large corporations and decisions are made at various levels.159 With this, it can be 
extremely “difficult to determine if an employee possessed the knowledge and crim-
inal intent necessary to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt”, much like the 
situation the government faced in prosecuting the PG&E case.160 Particularly, high-
level executives may still be insulated from the day-to-day activities in which the 
misconduct occurs.161These challenges, however, highlight the importance in the 
DOJ fully using its resources in an effort to identify the blameworthy individuals at 
all levels in corporate cases.162 Thus, the issuing of the Yates Memorandum, paired 
with the Pilot Program, provided the directives and incentives for the DOJ to make 
a necessary shift to individual accountability for corporate wrongdoing. This shift 
may not resolve all challenges that prosecuting corporate crime presents, but it is 
surely a step in the right direction. 
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